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Does Mother Know Best? 
The most obvious distinction between women and men is a woman's ability to 
become pregnant and to grow a new person within her body. This is also the 
female attribute that has been used to justify unequal and discriminatory 
treatment of women right up to the last decade of the twentieth century.' Of  
course, law does recognize the physical reality of pregnancy and provides for it. 
We have employment standards and labour code maternity leave provisions 
that explicitly address the need to accommodate the childbearing work of 
women.2 At its best, the law in Canada recognizes the autonomy of the woman 
who is pregnant, upholding her right not to have her bodily integrity interfered 
with in the name of the foetus. At  its worst, a pregnant woman is treated as a 
capricious creature who is a threat to the foetus and who needs to be mandated 
by law to undertake a particular course of action for the benefit of the foetus. 
But even at its best, the law does not fully comprehend the reality of pregnancy 
for most women. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that "those who bear children and 
benefit society as a whole thereby should not be economically or socially 
disadvantaged" and that itwould be "unfair to impose all the costs ofpregnancy 
upon one half of the pop~lation."~ Chief Justice Dickson is correct that it is 
"obvious" that women should not be made to bear a disproportionate cost of 
creating the next generation. However, analyzingwomen's situation in this way 
assumes that women can be restored to a position offull equality, just like men. 
In essence, the law is serving to reinforce the idea of the mother as an 
autonomous individual who should not be burdened by responsibility towards 
another. 
Yet the reality for women is that they are the ones who are pregnant, they 
are the ones who are doing the work of creating that future generation, and that 
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work does create burdens that only women bear. One woman described her 
experience like this: 
When I became pregnant I became aware in a much more concrete - 
way of what the limitations were.. . and how being a mother was 
different from being anything else.. . I had avery idealistic notion that 
being a parent would be a totally collective activity with my husband 
and myself. I t  immediately became apparent to me that Iwas the one 
who was pregnant.. . the first part of my pregnancy wasn't very easy. 
I felt the inequality of the situation there, and I felt it was just going 
to get worse. (McMahon, 1995: 80) 
What we must aim for is not to erase the contribution of mothers by 
attempting to make them the same as fathers, but rather to find a way to 
recognize the costs and contributions that women make through pregnancy 
and ensure that they do not create disadvantage. 
In this article, I propose to demonstrate the way that the law characterizes 
mothers and the work of mothering through an examination of legal discus- 
sions of pregnancy. I will consider the way that this aspect of mothering is 
handled by the law, contrasting it with the experience women have of this step 
on the path of motherhood. I will demonstrate that there is alackofcongruency 
between what the law says about mothers and what many women experience 
as mothers. There is little clear, public discussion by mothers ofwhat mothering 
means to them, or of how their work as mothers could be supported and 
recognized in a meaningful way in contemporary North American society. 
Within this context, policy continues to be formulated and court cases continue 
to be decided that have a direct effect upon women who are mothering, often 
with the result that these policies and cases do not reflect the lived experience 
of the mothers who are touched by them. 
I will highlight five themes that recur in the legal treatment of pregnancy. 
The minimization of the physical experience of the woman during her 
pregnancy, the tendency to rely upon a medicalized model of a normal life 
event, the tendencyto cast the woman into aposition ofconflictwith her foetus, 
the tendency to ignore the context within which a pregnant woman is carrying 
the foetus, and finally the tendency to overvalue the foetus and undervalue the 
pregnant woman are all hallmarks ofthe legal treatment ofpregnancy. Each of 
these approaches contributes to what I will argue is a basic lack of support for 
women's mothering that starts during pregnancy and continues after the birth 
of the child. 
At  its most basic, the reality of pregnancy is physical. The mere presence 
of the embryo, and later the foetus, triggers hormonal changes in the pregnant 
woman's body, and its growth brings about the more obvious physical changes 
such as increasing girth. Each pregnancyis unique. Accompanying the physical 
changes, and in fact directly connected to them, is the evolving relationship of 
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the woman to the new life that is developing within her. As the pregnancy 
progresses, her commitment to the foetus evolves also (Bergum, 1989). 
The very physical experience of pregnancy shapes and creates the mother. 
"Pregnancy is experienced not so much as a presence of a separate entity in the 
womb but as an alteration of the entire body" (Ashe, 1988: 549); it is an 
experience ofundifferentiation not easily expressed in language. "Even to speak 
of the pre-birth period as one of mother-child "interdependence" does not 
begin to do justice to the experiential reality ofpregnancy as a state ofbeing that 
is neither unitary nor dual, exactly; a state to which we can apply no number 
known to us. Pregnancy discloses the truth ofparadox" (Ashe, 1988: 551). For 
many women the physical experience is transformative; it creates a unique 
relationship to the future child that continues even after birth. "So profound are 
the alterations that occur in the process of pregnancy that a woman may find 
herself to be, in some senses, a 'different person' at the end of the pregnancy 
from the one she was at its start" (Ashe, 1988: 550). 
In contrast to this dynamic developing relationship that women experi- 
ence, most public characterizations of pregnancy tend to treat it as static. A 
woman simply is pregnant, and a woman and her foetus are Often the 
accompanying language describes this as a natural state.5 This serves the 
normative purpose of discounting the value of the pregnant woman's experi- 
ence and her active involvement in the process of nurturing the new life 
(Greschner, 1990). 
The silence of courts and policy makers about the physical realities of 
pregnancy and the very real contributions of the pregnant woman to the 
existence of the future child amounts to a denial of these contributions. In 
D.F.G., a recent Supreme Court decision dealing with a pregnant woman 
whose solvent-sniffing addiction posed a risk to her foetus, the majority made 
only a brief reference to the physical aspect of pregnancy. In the context of 
reviewing the "rights" of the foetus, Madam Justice McLaughlin said that 
allowing a foetus to sue its pregnant mother-to-be would change the law by 
treating the foetus and its mother as separate juristic persons. This, she noted, 
"is belied by the reality of the physical situation; for practical purposes, the 
unborn child and its mother-to-be are bonded in a union separable only by 
birth" (181). 
In two earlier cases dealing with abortion: the Supreme Court failed to 
acknowledge the physical aspect of pregnancy in anything but the most general 
of terms. The various judgments note that delays causing late term abortions 
could be physically harmful and emotionally stressful to a woman seeking to 
end her pregnancy but they do not really recognize the physical demands 
created by the simple fact of being pregnant.' Such a situation is simply 
described as a "predicament" (Daigle, 1989). The minorityjudgements in such 
cases go further than simply ignoring the bodily contribution of women to the 
development of the foetus, to the point of actively dismissing what women 
experience. Justice Major in D.F. G. notes that incarcerating the mother could 
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"so easily" prevent harm to the foetus and the imposition upon her is "fairly 
m o d e ~ t " . ~  McIntyre and LaForest JJ in Morgentaler minimize the physical 
aspect by saying that the right to "security of the person" can't include the mere 
physical fact of being pregnant, but must include some other underlying right 
(469). The Justices state that an infringement of a woman's security of the 
person must be something more than mere "stress and anxiety" (471). Judges 
in the lower courts in the Daigle case spoke flippantly of the "inconvenience" 
to her of being compelled to continue the pregnancy (641). 
The minimization ofwomen's creative and active physical involvement in 
their pregnancies can be attributed to a reliance on the medical model of 
pregnancy that dominates our discourse in law. Evolving medical knowledge 
about the development of the foetus, as well as the ability to intervene in the 
birth process, tend to break into discrete events, a process which ordinarily 
occurs, uninterrupted, within one woman's body. As Ashe concludes, 
The emphases on separability and discontinuity operate to obscure 
precisely those features of female reproduction which differentiate its 
process most clearly from that of the male reproductive experience. 
That is, they define a resemblance to the experience of men, who, after 
the act of "sperm donation", however accomplished, experience 
neither the continuous bodily process constituting the development 
of a human child nor the bodily identitywith that child, which are felt 
by women who desire or accede to pregnancy and birth. (1988: 541) 
The medical model removes the power of women with respect to their 
pregnancies and places it the hands of doctors or, in some cases, the state. The 
model allows women to be depicted as self-interested or incompetent? The 
standards of medicine become the norm against which a pregnant woman's 
behavior is judged and a woman who decides against the norm of medical 
science is cast as irrational and selfish. Awoman who defies the truth ofmedical 
knowledge becomes a bad mother, one who has declined to put the perceived 
needs of the foetus ahead of her own concerns.1° 
Lisa Ikemoto speaks of the dominance of the medical model, and the 
reliance of the state upon it, as forming part of the "practice of controlling 
women with respect to conception, gestation and childbirth in ways that 
express the dominant cultural notions ofmotherhood" (1992: 1207). She terms 
this the Code of Perfect Pregnancy and notes that what were previously social 
norms are increasingly becoming institutionalized legal duties, with a corre- 
sponding regulation of pregnant women. The responsibility of a Good Mother 
of course includes the notion of sacrifice. According to Ikemoto, "under the 
Code, women bear the responsibility of "motherhood" but are not deemed 
entitled to the authority to define it" (1992: 1207). 
The state itself may also rely upon medical knowledge to regulate the 
behavior of pregnant women either through criminal prosecutions or by 
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allowing civil actions. In this way, medical knowledge, about fetal development 
as well as the effects of drugs and alcohol on the foetus, provides "the reason for 
directing state power at women and casts such use of power in a reasonable 
light." (Ikemoto, 1992: 1303) The minority in D.F. G. placed undue reliance on 
the state of medical knowledge. Major J. found that the primitive medical 
knowledge upon which the 'born alive' rule was based had been taken over by 
technologies that now "can clearly show us" the condition of the foetus (205). 
The implication is that with such clear information about the foetus, others are 
now in a position to make decisions that had previously only been sensible for 
the pregnant woman to make. According to Major J., there is no need to defer 
to her judgment. 
Julia Hanigsberg also demonstrates that the bodily integrity and medical 
decision making ofwomen are systematically accorded less respect than that of 
men. In cases where patients sought to decline life-sustaining medical treat- 
ments, men's decisions were most likely to be upheld while women's were not. 
"An analysis of the language of these judgments shows that men are depicted 
as subject to a medical assault; women are depicted as vulnerable to medical 
neglect. This language suggests that the integrity of male bodies is self-evident 
while intervention in female bodies is expected" (1995: 385). In the case of 
pregnant women who are terminally ill, some states expressly remove the right 
to make decisions with respect to life support that are otherwise available to 
competent adults (King, 1989). 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect ofthe removal of authority from women 
that the dominance of the medical model effects, is that it allows a pregnant 
woman to be viewed simply as the means to an end, as a fetal container 
(Greschner, 1990). The development of technologies that allow the viewing of 
the foetus also support an understanding of a pregnant woman and her foetus 
as essentially separate." This separation of woman and foetus underlies the 
most common feature of legal and social discourse with respect to pregnancy, 
both of which often cast a woman and her foetus into a position of conflict. 
When cases involving pregnant women end up before the courts, they have 
been brought there by a contest which pits the interests of the woman against 
those of some other party, whether the foetus itself, a future father or the state. 
As Madam Justice McLachlin noted in D.F. G. the simple fact of allowing an 
action to be brought, may create a conflict between the pregnant woman as an 
autonomous decision-maker and her foetus (182). 
Women can of course experience feelings of conflict with the new person 
that is developing within. How a woman experiences her pregnancy will 
depend on how she feels about it, and can vary from pregnancy to pregnancy, 
as well as throughout a single pregnancy. What pregnant woman hasn't 
resented the (not so) little intruder by the time it has occupied her body for 40 
long weeks. A woman whose pregnancy is unwanted may be even more likely 
to perceive a conflict with the foetus (Ashe, 1988). Nonetheless, women's 
experience of this conflict is different from the way it becomes characterized in 
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court decisions. Ambivalence is not the same as an unrestrained contest of 
rights. 
The main feature of court decisions dealing with pregnancy is the notion 
of the mother and the foetus as separate entities with separate interests. 
However it is most often the case that a woman and her foetus do not have 
interests in conflict, but rather in common. She does not benefit from her drug 
abuse anyrnore than the foetus does. Both will be better off when she is in a 
position to be able to accept the responsibilities of mothering, and both would 
benefit from more support during pregnancy and after the birth of the child. 
Women who are making decisions that will impact their foetuses do so from 
aposition ofconnectedness. At the most elementallevel there is the connection 
between the foetus and the pregnant woman. But she also exists within a social 
milieu where she must makeher decisions while considering the needs of 
foetus, other family members and herself. 
In contrast with the way that many women experience a sense of connec- 
tion to the foetus developing within them, the legal and political discourse is 
premised upon a conflict between them. In cases that end up in litigation, this 
notion of conflict arises because remedies are being sought within the context 
ofthe litigation. Remedies are based upon rights, but the notion of rights is not 
suitable in this context. Greschner describes rights as "trumps attached to 
individuals," but the notion of separate individuals underlying-the concept of 
rights is not consonant with how women think of themselves and is an utterly 
inappropriate descriptor of a pregnant woman (1990: 652). Furthermore, the 
assumption that a woman and her foetus are in conflict implies an assumption 
thatwomen need to be controlled to keep their foetuses from harm (Hanigsberg, 
1991). As many authors have noted, creating rights for a foetus has the effect 
of erasing the mother. (Greschner, 1990; Hanigsberg, 1991) 
Courts in Canada have not ultimatelyfound that foetuses have rights, even 
though the arguments have often been made. In D.F. G., the majority held that 
it could not make the radical extension to the law requested by the agency 
because it was beyond the power of the court to make a change that would 
"seriously intrude on the rights of women." But even the majority failed to 
acknowledge the pregnant woman's knowing of her foetus. Rather it simply 
stated that she is an autonomous individual upon whose bodily integrity the 
Court may not infringe. The majority recognized that the interests of the 
woman and the foetus are not antagonisitic, and that it cannot protect the foetus 
without impairing the liberty ofthe mother. Although the majorityreached the 
right result in its decision, it lacked the recognition of the interconnectedness 
that is a real part of the experience. 
The minorityjudgment in D.F. G., in contrast, is premisedupon the notion 
of a conflict between the pregnant woman and her foetus. It  is dear that the 
woman in this case is viewed as the enemy of her foetus (203). The language 
deplores her "abusive behavior towards her foetus," while ignoring her connec- 
tion to it by asserting that she may choose to have an abortion "at any time." The 
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judgment also presumes a choice where in fact there may be none. Choice 
requires that there be genuine possibilities to choose among and that there be 
no external influences controlling the decision-making. Access to abortion, 
even in Canada, is limited by late gestational age, and economic, geographic or 
political factors. Furthermore, addictions or violent spouses may limit the 
ability of a pregnant woman to exercise free choice. Often in such situations 
women don't have the physical or emotional resources and support to make a 
decision and simply remain pregnant by doing nothing. In such a case, the 
woman may not have made an explicit choice to be pregnant (Baylis, 1997-98). 
In nearly every case discussed here the courts have failed to take account 
of the circumstances within which the women concerned were attempting to 
live out their pregnancies. The implicit reliance by the courts on the norm of 
the ligood mother" means that they are in essence applying a universal standard 
that ignores circumstances. (Ikemoto, 1992) The indigence, addiction, or 
ongoing abuse which many women survive while pregnant is often left 
undiscussed, or simply unmentioned. Yet in almost all the cases which have 
ended up before the courts, the circumstances of the pregnant women have 
been less than ideal both for the women themselves and for the future child.12 
In each of these cases, both the mother and the child would have fared much 
better if some regard had been given to the mother's circumstances and if the 
facilities or programs existed to provide her with adequate support. AU of the 
cases demonstrate a lack of support for the future mothers and future children. 
I t  is clear this is an area of law that could be developed in a more positive way. 
In all of the cases discussed here, there is rhetoric and argument about the 
rights or the personhood of the foetus. The effect of the debate continuing to 
be cast in this manner is that the foetus is glorified while the value of the mother 
herself, as well as of her contribution to creating the new human being, is 
minimized. The law supports a tremendous interest in the baby as a future 
person. In D.F. G., Major J .  is emphatic about the state's interest in the foetus. 
He stated that "the state has an enforceable interest in ensuring, to the extent 
practicable, the well-being of the unborn child" (192). 
I t  is no surprise that the judgment of Major J. in D.F. G. strikes a cord in 
caring people. A concern for the future of a child exposed to a harm that could 
be avoided is common to many and does form a suitable foundation for social 
policy. Unfortunately, the only way that is conceived of to avoid the harm is to 
impose a tremendous burden upon the mother. None of the judgments in any 
ofthese cases considers other possible ways ofavoiding the harm without laying 
the blame and the burden exclusively upon the mother.13 In our culture and in 
our laws we expect the most from a mother; she should be self-sacrificing. We 
hold mothers and pregnant women to a higher moral standard than we require 
of other members of society. Very often women want to make such sacrifices, 
and more often they actually do. But this should not be compelled by external 
forces. In the context of her relationship with the foetus the mother will strive 
for a balance: 
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Mothers have attention to the needs of both the foetus and the self. 
In all relationships, not just mother and child, there must be attention 
to the needs of both partners in the relationship. In mothering 
however there seems to be a readyrnade rule that says that the needs 
of the child always come first. Such a rule needs qualification and 
reconsideration. The chlld's needs are important, but if there is no 
attention to the needs of the mother as well, both the child and the 
mother will suffer. (Bergum, 1997: 146) 
It  is clear that law and policy must be directed at ensuring positive 
outcomes for pregnency, but it must be appropriatelyfoc~ssed.~~Canada could 
go a long way to improving children's prospects and women's 
equality by focussing policy and spending on women and children.'' One 
author has stated that "concern about fetal welfare may reasonably be described 
as bizarre in a jurisdiction that makes only the most limited provisions for 
prenatal care, for post-natal and infant care, and for the provision of housing 
and nutrition for children after birth" (Rodgers, 1993: 91). Another has argued 
that "protecting and caring for the foetus means protecting and caring for the 
pregnant woman-through adequate housing, nutrition, education, medical 
care and freedom from physical and emotional abuse." (Overall, 1989:103) 
Conclusion 
The legal and social response to pregnancy is an instance of the general 
legal and social response to mothering. In minimizing the value of the work 
done by mothers, whether the actual physical sacrifice of growing a new life or 
the longer-term physical and emotional workof raising strong children, the law 
diminishes motherwork. In accepting the medicalizedview ofa woman and her 
foetus as separate and in conflict, the law fails to take account ofthe relation and 
corresponding dependencies that are at the core of mothering. By ignoring the 
myriad circumstance in which women bring their children to birth (and in 
which they continue to raise them after birth), the law fails to provide the 
supports that would help to insure the best possible outcome for these children 
who have historically been valued so greatly as foetuses. 
Because of each of these attitudes, crystallized in the law, but free-floating 
in society, women's contribution in bringing new humans to birth, to life, 
becomes invisible. Pregnancy and mothering are constructed as natural, and 
thus notworthy ofnotice. No legal and social support is required. The legal and 
social characterization ofpregnancy reflects a devaluation ofwomen's mother- 
ing and an attempt to prescribe a model of the perfect mother for all without 
backing it up with real support that might make it more possible. 
Support for mothering is essential for the benefit of the children, the 
mothers and society generally. Julia Hanigsberg has a clear prescription: 
The way to help fetuses [and children] is conceptually simple-help 
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women. By treating women as rational, moral decision-makers and 
as people worthy of state support (as the state seems to imply fetuses 
are) women and their children will be helped.. .. By directing its 
powerful resources at making women's lives better, the state would 
not only help women and fetuses, but it would also help children. 
For in its myopic concentration on fetuses, children go by the 
wayside. What happens to the child apprehended en ventre sa mere? 
When a child is apprehended in utero, then taken away from its 
mother once born and put into an already overburdened foster care 
system within which it may be shunted from home to home, who 
has been well served? (1991: 68) 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in the 
case ofDobson v. Dobson.16 In the reasons ofthe majority, many ofthe concerns 
and criticisms that I have leveled against the legal and social characterizations 
of mothers have been addressed. The majority is quite clear that women's 
autonomy and liberty must be respected and that women can be trusted to act 
in the best interests of their foetuses. The court feared that the application of 
an objective standard would allow judges to dictate a woman's behavior 
according to their own notions of proper conduct, failing to recognize the great 
disparities in financial situations, education, access to health services, and 
ethnic backgrounds of pregnant women. Most importantly perhaps, the court 
recognized that a lackof support for mothering (in the specific context of caring 
for children with disabilities) made the job of caring more difficult. Women, 
it held, are in the best position to determine the best that they can do to promote 
the well-being of their future children. 
Perhaps we can view the Dobson case as a sign of change, as the beginning 
of a recognition of the value of mothering and of its important impact upon 
mothers, both at an individual level and in terms oftheir position within society. 
Maybe we can begin to accord respect to women for their motherwork and 
move towards a situation where women's equality does not only mean the right 
to be just like a man. Maybe we are finally beginning to recognize, as Greschner 
says, that "it is not the case that foetuses do not have a voice; it is simply that 
their voices-mothers' voices-are the ones that patriarchy does not want to 
hear" (1990: 654). 
'It wasn't until 1989 that the Supreme Court held that discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy was indeed discrimination on the basis of sex and that 
accordingly it was impermissible. The court stated that to hold otherwise would 
undermine the purposes of anti-discrimination legislation by "sanctioning one 
of the most significant ways in which women have been disadvantaged in our 
society" Brooksv. CanadaSafewayInc. [l9891 1 S.C.R 1219 at 1238perDickson 
C.J.C. Hereinafter Brooks. See also Turnbull (1989). 
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21n Ontario in 1997, the Court of Appeal recognized the particular circum- 
stances of a woman who has been pregnant, given birth and potentially 
established breastfeedingfor an infant. The Court held that her entitlement to 
leave time that was not available to adoptive mothers or any fathers was not 
contrary to the equality provisions of the Charter. Re Schafer et alandAttorney 
GeneralofCanada, (1997) 35 O.R. 3d 1 (C.A.). 
3Brooks at 1243,per Dickson C.J.C. 
Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) (1997) 3 1 
R.F.L,. (4") 165 (S.C.C.) hereinafter D.F. G.at 180perMcLachlin J. Byway of 
contrast, Wilson J in Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen (1988), 44 
D.L.R. (4h) 385 (S.C.C.) hereinafter Morgentaler. at 499 specifically notes the 
"essentially developmental nature ofthe gestation process" remarking that both 
camps in the abortion debate fail to take account of this. She goes on to argue 
that acknowledging the developmental view of the foetus would support 
unrestrained access to abortion in the earlier stages of a pregnancy and a more 
restrictive approach in the later stages. 
'Thelimits ofthelanguage we have, and the lack of alanguage ofour own, mean 
that any attempt to think or speak about mothering is coloured by the ideologies 
of the owners of the language. When policy is made affecting mothers, or cases 
decided about mothers, the outcomes are shaped by the way in which the 
questions are asked in the first place. As Marie Ashe has put it: 
Law-language, in its long history of "essentialist" error, has tradition- 
ally failed to recognize differences among women. In so failing, it has 
denigrated our cultural activity, our individual self-namings as- 
among other things-mothers or non-mothers. To  the degree that it 
has departed from that error, law-language at the present time, in the 
context of issues relating to discrimination based on sex or gender, 
tends towards the "egalitarian" error involved in denials of the 
singularities of female bodily experience. That error, holding nature 
in contempt, would destroy the best work of female bodies as well as 
that of female minds. (1988: 559) 
6Morgentaler and Tremblay v. Daigle (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4") 634 (S.C.C.) 
hereinafter Daigle. 
'Madam Justice Wilson in Morgentaler showed the greatest recognition that 
interference with a woman's decisions about her pregnancy constitutes a direct 
interference with her physical person, although the judgment of Dickson 
C.J.C. and Lamer J. also states at one point that "forcing a woman, by threat 
of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless she meets certain criteria 
unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with 
a woman's body and thus a violation of security of the person." 
'The minority also described the detention of Ms. G. as "treatment not 
punishment." 
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T h e  words of the minority in D.F. G. are even more patronizing. Mr. Justice 
Major says women "must accept some responsibility" for their foetuses and 
characterizes as "reckless" a pregnant woman who is addicted to a substance 
which may cause harm to her foetus. 
T h e r e  are many cases of forced caesarians both in Canada and the United 
States. See for example Re Baby R. (1988) 53 D.L.R. (4&) 69. 
"Ashe lists such technologies as laparoscopy, amniocentesis, chorionic biopsy, 
ultrasound scanning, and fetal monitoring as contributing to the tendency to 
see the foetus and the woman as separate and sometimes antagonistic entities 
(1988: 539-40). This is captured by Vangie Bergum: 
As we more frequently take a technological look at the woman and the 
foetus as separate entities it becomes credible for the foetus to become 
the patient and for the woman to be seen as the human incubator. 
From the point of view of women's experience of pregnancy such 
notions are totally foreign, in fact, repugnant. Pregnancy is not 
experienced as one versus the other (that is one plus one); rather, it is 
one with the other (two in one)-an altogether different relationship. 
The technological world of medicine does not understand this dis- 
tinction. Technological fragmentation easily separates woman and 
foetus, biology and culture, public and private, mother and child- 
and in doing so easily destroys, or at least disregards, the relational 
impulse. (1997: 144) 
121n Re Childreni Aid Society ofthe City ofBelleville, Hastings County and T, 
(1987) 59 O.R. (2d) 204 (Fam. Ct.). Linda T. was poor. She also wished to 
avoid medical assistance during her pregnancy. Without looking any further, 
the judge proclaimed that "her attitude is not conducive to the safe and healthy 
delivery of the child" and ordered her confined for three months under the 
Mental Health Act for observation, with objective of keeping her until child 
was born. In Re children'sdid Societyfor the District ofKenora andJL., (1981) 
134 DLR (3d) 249 (Ont. Fam. Ct.) although the judge noted Ms. L.'s 
homelessness and alcoholism, as well as the fact that she was beaten by her 
common law partner, he found that the fetal alcohol syndrome suffered by the 
child had been "willfully inflicted by her mother, who refused to seek help for 
her alcohol problem despite the entreaties of the doctor." A similar disregard 
for the mother's circumstances is evidenced inJ M. v. Superintendent ofFamily 
and Child Services. (1983) 35 RFL (2d) 364 (B.C.C.A.) affg sub nom Re 
Superintendent $Family and Child Services and McDonald (1982) 135 D.L.R. 
(3d) 330 (B.C.S.C.).Ms. MacDonaldwas a member ofthe Nisga Nation. She 
came from a family of drug abusers, and had herself been addicted to heroin 
since the age of 12. The judge also noted that Ms. MacDonald's common law 
partner seemed "to totally dominate" her. Notwithstanding this, the judge 
concluded that Ms. MacDonald had abused her baby "during the gestation 
136 1 Volume 3, Number 1 
The Legal Characterization of Pregnancy and Mothering 
period" by her continuing use ofmethadone (on her doctor's recommendation). 
13Major J. in D.F. G. sees the situation thus: "If our society is to protect the 
health and well-being of children, there must exist jurisdiction to order a pre- 
birth remedy preventing a mother from causing serious harm to her foetus. 
Someone must speak for those who cannot speak for themselves." He does not 
consider that we could also protect the health and well-being of children by 
eradicating poverty and the horrific conditions within which many members of 
Aboriginal communities live in Canada. 
141n considering cases like D.F. G., we must ask ourselves the questions posed 
by Laura Shanner in her comment on the case. She urges us to "consider why 
an Aboriginal rather than a Caucasian woman became the test case defendant; 
why solvent sniffing (associated with poor communities) rather than cocaine, 
alcohol or tobacco (also associated with higher socioeconomic groups) was the 
teratogen of concern; why addiction treatment facilities were not immediately 
available to a pregnant, chronic substance abuser who responsibly agreed to 
seek help; and why our protection of offspring is more often focussed on the 
fetal period than on the underlying health ofwomen prior to conception or on 
the conditions of poverty in to which many children are born (1997-98: 753). 
151n comparison with other OECD countries, Canada's rate of infant mortality 
of 6.1 per 1000 is somewhat high. More than two thirds of the infant deaths 
occurred in first four weeks of infant's life and of these 60 percent were caused 
by respiratory distress syndrome, short gestation and low birth weight, all 
factors associated with poverty. A modest investment in the health and well- 
being of pregnant women, and infants and their mothers, would yield benefits 
to children that could last a lifetime Health Canada Fact Sheet: Infant Mortality 
supra note 161 at 1-2; Healthy Parents, Healthy Babies, supra note 204 at 3,4,33. 
16Dobson v. Dobson, [l9991 2 S.C.R. 753. 
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